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Abstract Negotiations proceed differently across cultures. For realistic modeling
of agents in multicultural negotiations, the agents must display culturally differenti-
ated behavior. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that tackles these
challenges, based on Hofstede’s model of national cultures. The context is a trade
network for goods with a hidden quality attribute. The negotiation model is based on
the ABMP negotiation architecture and applies a utility function that includes market
value, quality preference and risk attitude. The five dimensions of Hofstede’s model
are the basis for the modification of ABMP parameters and weight factors in the util-
ity function. The agents can observe each other’s group membership and status. This
information is used, along with the indices of Hofstede’s dimensions, to differentiate
behavior in different cultural settings. The paper presents results of test runs that ver-
ify the implementation of the model. The model helps to explain behaviors of actors
in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to
generate culturally differentiated agents. Further validations of the model with case
studies from literature and experiments have yet to be conducted. Extensions can make
this model a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural negotiation
and for implementation in negotiation support systems.
G. J. Hofstede
Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands
C. M. Jonker
Delft Technical University, Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands
T. Verwaart (B)
LEI Wageningen UR, Postbus 29703, 2502 LS Den Haag, The Netherlands
e-mail: tim.verwaart@wur.nl
123
G. J. Hofstede et al.
Keywords Multi-agent simulation · Culture · Bargaining · Negotiation ·
Trade network
1 Introduction
Anybody with experience in international trade knows that bargaining practices differ
across the world. Multinational companies sometimes work with different price lists
for different countries. To give just one example: whereas German buyers want to
know exactly how much the products cost, Arabs need to have room for bargaining.
In order to sell at the same price, the selling company needs to adapt its offer to the
varying bargaining practices. This means that a single piece of advice about how to
bargain, or a single model to describe bargaining, are obviously not valid across the
world unless culture is taken into account.
‘Culture’ is a notion with many meanings, some of which are contested in some
disciplines. However, the leading paradigm today is widely accepted and used in both
practice and academia. According to it, culture refers to the unwritten rules of society.
Culture is that which makes a group cohesive by smoothing communication. It is a
phenomenon that is specific to a group, not to an individual. Its essence is unconscious
shared systems of values, and it is transmitted in early youth through example and edu-
cation. As a result it is stable across centuries in spite of huge changes in environment
and technology. Cultural differences show no signs of diminishing in the Information
Age (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005).
Within the literature various basic dimensions can be found according to which
societies differ from one another. Of these, the most widely used is Hofstede’s model
(Hofstede 2001), (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). His work is accessible, sparse, and
based on a very large, very well stratified sample that continues to give it great explan-
atory value. No other model matches society-level variables so well to date (Smith
2004).
This paper describes an agent-based model for bargaining in the context of trade.
The agents follow common sense strategies such as maximizing gain, seeking good
quality, and minimizing risk. But they also have models of how to behave in an appro-
priate manner. These models are based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture. The
challenge that we take up is the one posed by De Rosis et al. (2004), who suggested to
investigate the feasibility of Hofstede’s model for building culturally consistent agent
characters. An agent-based model of bargaining in which the agents are cultured offers
several promises. It can help understand the dynamics of international negotiations in
trade. It could also serve as a training tool for aspiring international traders.
The paper first briefly introduces Hofstede’s model of five dimensions of culture.
Next, the ABMP (Agent-Based Market Place, Jonker and Treur 2001) negotiation
model that we adopt is presented. We show how this model can be used in agent-
based simulations. We also discuss the limited subset of negotiation situations that
are considered in this article. In the third section we link culture and negotiation by
describing the influence of each of Hofstede’s dimensions of culture on negotiators’
practices and preferences. This section sets the scene for the presentation of the rules
for our cultured agents in the fourth section. Section five shows example runs with the
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model and discusses them. Finally we discuss the model and how to proceed, since
this model forms the basis of future research and tools.
2 Hofstede’s Five Dimensions of Culture
Each human society has found a different pattern of response to the problems of social
life. In some societies, groups are permanent and close-knit while in others, group
membership is volatile and voluntary. In some, leadership style is usually autocratic
and in others, participative. Research has shown and repeatedly confirmed that basic
tendencies to deal with a few central issues of social life are stable across the genera-
tions in societies (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). They are, because they are instilled
into a society’s members from birth. As a baby and as a toddler, a child is primed as
a social being. Once a child sets foot into the wider society as a teenager, its basic
cultural orientation is firmly in place.
This research stream has led to dimension models of culture. The most widely
used of these is the five-dimension model by Hofstede. The five dimensions are about
five issues that relate to our basic drives. They will be introduced briefly in order to
use them further on in the text. Note that these are not personality traits, but societal
patterns! Also note that the picture drawn here is necessarily simplified. It presents
the two caricatured extremes of each dimension. In reality, almost all cultures have
intermediate positions on almost all dimensions. The dimensions are introduced in the
following subsections.
2.1 Collectivism Versus Individualism
This dimension is about affiliation. To a collectivist (e.g., East Asian, most non-Western
countries) mindset, fixed membership of a single group in which all members are inter-
dependent is the natural state of being human. No member of the natural group can be
cast aside. This means that maintaining harmony is crucial.
To an individualist (e.g., North-American, North-west European) mindset, self-
sufficiency is the natural state of being. Everybody should be judged in the same way,
whether or not the person is a group member. Honest people speak their minds, even
if that means open disagreement.
2.2 Hierarchy: Large Versus Small Power Distance
This dimension is about dominance as an ascribed quality. It has to do with author-
ity as seen from below. Are parents, teachers, priests and bosses held in awe, and
is autocratic leadership expected? Then we have a society of large power distance
(e.g., China, India, Russia.).
Or is leadership a role that could change from one person to another with ease,
and are all people born equal? In that case, the society is one of small power distance
(e.g., Anglo and Germanic countries).
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2.3 Aggression and Gender: Masculinity Versus Femininity
This dimension is about assertive dominance, about muscle power, and about the emo-
tional roles of the two sexes. In what is called a masculine society (e.g., Japan, Anglo
countries), men in particular are supposed to be fighters. Women are supposed to be
cheerleaders to the men’s fight—but they have to be tough too. Men try to look and act
like real men and women try to look and act like real women. These are tough societies,
with strong-handed police and military and with heavy punishment for offenders.
In what is called feminine societies (e.g., Scandinavian countries), both men and
women are supposed to be peace-loving and consensus seeking and their social behav-
iors are not strongly different. Criminals should be helped, not punished.
2.4 Otherness and Truth: Uncertainty Avoidance
This dimension is about how to cope with the unknowable. Some societies are termed
uncertainty avoiding (e.g., Arab, Latin and Slavic countries). They tend to have strict
rules and rituals about things that are strange or different, such as religious rules and
food taboos, or strange sexual practices. In these societies, the distinction between
clean and dirty is important. In fact they feel that any distinction should be a sharp
one. They are concerned about right and wrong, about theory, about arguing for its own
sake. They like to show their emotions, particularly anxiety, verbally and non-verbally.
Other societies are termed uncertainty tolerant (e.g., Anglo countries, China, Scan-
dinavia, Vietnam). They are relaxed and curious about strange things and people, and
not worried about establishing strict classification schemes for everything. They value
exploratory behaviors and novel experiences, and a relaxed communication style.
2.5 Short Versus Long-Term Gratification of Needs
This dimension is about all the basic human drives. Which drive should get precedence,
one that presses now or one that might become pressing in ten years? Some societies
live for today, and these are termed short-term oriented. Behaving in an appropriate
manner and respecting conventions is important in these societies, as well as ‘keeping
up with the Joneses’ as the Americans have it. There are strong opinions about good
and bad, and these are believed to be immutable.
Other societies live for the future; these are termed long-term oriented (e.g. China,
Japan). Reasoning is pragmatic, and principles are adapted to context. Good and bad
are seen as complementary and changeable. Planning, foresight and perseverance are
valued. On the downside, this could lead to stinginess and calculation.
2.6 Five Dimensions, One World
So far in this text, the dimensions of culture have been isolated from one another in an
artificial way. In reality, cultures have a recognizable feel to them, a Gestalt that can
be described, albeit only roughly, by its combination of dimension scores. The five
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dimensions are no more than abstractions that capture main behavioral trends. Cultures
have ‘Gestalts’ of behavior. Experienced negotiators know the range of behaviors that
they can expect from negotiators from other parts of the world. They also know how
gender, age, status and personality can affect the negotiation style of people from these
parts of the world.
In Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009) the influence of each of the dimensions
on trade processes was modeled separately; a slightly artificial, but also necessary
intermediate step to model agents differentiated along the Hofstede dimensions. Rec-
onciling these dimensional models into one believable model that shows the ‘whole
negotiator’, although still abstracting from personality, is the aim of this article.
3 Negotiation
In bilateral negotiation, two parties aim at reaching a joint agreement. They do so by
exchanging various offers or bids using e.g. an alternating offers protocol (Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994) called the “negotiation dance” in Raiffa et al. (2002). Negoti-
ation is a complex emotional decision-making process aiming to reach an agreement
to exchange goods or services (Thompson 2005).
3.1 Agent Models for Negotiation
The literature on automated negotiation contains a number of agent models for nego-
tiation. The focus of that literature is on reaching deals that are Pareto-efficient (i.e.,
neither can improve without making the situation worse for the other). Furthermore,
some aim at reaching fair outcomes, i.e., in which the deal is equally good for both
parties. The strategies differ in whether or not they take knowledge about the domain,
and/or opponent into account. Examples of strategies that do not use any domain
or opponent knowledge can be found in Faratin et al. (1998) and Jonker and Treur
(2001). Other strategies try to learn the opponent’s preferences, see e.g., (Coehoorn
and Jennings 2004) and (Hindriks and Tykhonov 2008). The work presented in this
paper aims to develop models of actual human behavior. It does not aim to develop an
optimal bargaining strategy that can outperform human negotiators or other agents.
3.2 Focus on Interpersonal Bargaining
This work focuses on a specific type of negotiations: two persons bargaining about
business transactions. Gaming simulations form the context of the bargaining ses-
sions. The gaming simulations are designed as tools in supply chains and networks
research (Meijer et al. 2006). In this setting participants negotiate a transaction of a
commodity with either base quality or a superior quality. The real quality is known to
the supplier and invisible to the customer. The customer can either trust the supplier’s
quality statement, or request third-party testing at the cost of a fee. A customer may
negotiate that the supplier provide certified quality by third-party testing and have the
commodity delivered with the test report as a certificate. So, the relevant attributes for
comparing bids are price, quality, and certification.
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If the quality is above base level and the transaction is not certified, the customer
is exposed to the risk of supplier’s opportunism. The valuations of quality and risk
have a rational component that can be calculated from market value and probabil-
ity of deceit. Furthermore, they have a subjective component that is influenced by a
trader’s personality and culture. The rational component of the valuation of quality is
the difference in market price with the price of base quality. The rational component
of the valuation of risk is the product of probability of deceit and value of the quality
attribute. The subjective valuation comes in addition to the rational value. For quality,
it is the trader’s quality preference, for instance because of the societal status that
results from trading high quality products. For risk, it is an agent’s risk aversion. To a
risk-averse agent, the absence of risk has a value by itself.
In a culturally homogeneous society, not all agents have equal quality preference
and risk aversion. However, significant differences between cultures exist in the aver-
age values of these parameters.
3.3 Agent-Based Market Place (ABMP) and its Application in the Agents
For the agents’ negotiation strategy we chose ABMP (Jonker and Treur 2001), because
its similarity to human negotiations has been validated (Bosse et al. 2004). The ABMP
process is an exchange of bids, starting with a bid by one of the partners. The other
partner evaluates the bid using a utility function that maps a weighted linear combi-
nation of bid attributes to the interval [0, 1]. The weight factors in the utility function
represent an agent’s preferences. The utility function used in this research is elaborated
in a following subsection.
ABMP is a concession strategy. An agent prepares a bid that is a concession to
its previous bid. Concession factor γ and negotiation speed β are the parameters that
govern the concession making.
Concession factor γ is the fraction of the opening bid’s utility that the agent is
willing to give in during the negotiation. It determines the minimum utility that is
acceptable to an agent, also called the reservation value.
Negotiation speed β is the fraction of difference between the agent’s previous bid
and the minimum utility that an agent uses to determine the target utility of its next bid.
After calculation of the utility of a partner’s bid and the target utility of its own next
bid, the agent decides whether to accept partners bid or not, governed by the utility
gap parameter ω.
Acceptable utility gap ω is the maximal difference between own target utility and
last partner’s bid’s utility for which an agent will accept partner’s bid.
If the target utility minus the partner’s last bid’s utility is greater than the acceptable
utility gap, the agent does not accept and has to decide about its next action. It can
terminate the negotiation for several reasons. First, partner’s bid may be interpreted
as unrealistic if its utility is too far below the minimum utility. Second, an agent may
be unsatisfied by the progress in partner’s bids. Third, there may be no more room for
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a substantial change of attributes to make a bid with the target utility. In the latter case
the agent terminates the negotiation. In the first two cases the probability that an agent
terminates the negotiation depends on the impatience parameter ι.
Impatience ι is the probability that an agent will terminate the negotiation if (a) the
utility of partner’s bid is less than the cut-off value or (b) progress in the last three
rounds is less than the minimal progress required. In the present model the cut-off
value φ is computed from minimum utility µ:
φ = (1 − ι)µ.
Minimal progress ϕ over three rounds of negotiation is computed as
ϕ = (1 − µ)ι.
So, the decisions whether to accept a bid or not and whether to continue or not depend
on partner’s bid, own last bid, partner’s progress, and the values of parameters γ, β, ω,
and ι. Evaluation of bids involves the utility function discussed in the next subsection.
This utility function is also used in planning a new bid that has the target utility, taking
the agent’s quality preference and risk aversion into account.
3.4 The utility function
The agent model applies a utility function as proposed by Tykhonov et al. (2008):
U (b) = wvV (b) + wq Q(b) + wr R(b),
with 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, i = v, q, r, and ∑wi = 1.
V (b) represents the business value of a bid. A customer agent calculates it as
Vc = 1 − v + q − rc2 ,
with v representing the price of the bid, mapped to the interval [0, 1] (0 represents
minimal market price for base quality of the commodity; 1 represents maximal market
price for top quality); q in [0, 1] (0 represents base quality; 1 top quality); customers
cost of risk is calculated as
rc = (1 − c)(1 − t)q,
with c = 1 representing presence and c = 0 absence of a quality certificate; t rep-
resents the customers trust in the supplier, defined as the customer’s estimate of the
probability that the supplier will cooperate and deliver according to contract, even if
the supplier has the motive and the opportunity to defect.
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For a supplier the business value of a bid is calculated as
Vs = 1 + v − q − rs2 ,
with suppliers cost of risk
rs = c f,
where f stands for the certification fee scaled to the same ratio as v.
Both customers and suppliers may have a preference in excess of the market value
for dealing top quality rather than base quality products. A trader’s preference for
dealing top quality, even if profits from base quality trade are superior, is represented
by wq ; in the present model Q(b) is computed as:
Q = q − 0.5.
Some traders may be risk-averse, in which case wr is positive. In the present simulation
suppliers are informed about the actual quality level, so
Rs = 0.
For risk-avoiding customers the absence of risk may have a value in itself, which is
represented as follows in the present model:
Rc = 0.5 − rc.
4 Culture and Bargaining
Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009) modeled the influence of culture on trade
processes for each of the five dimensions separately. From these papers, the narra-
tive descriptions of the influences of the dimensions on trade negotiations—i.e. the
bargaining about transactions—are cited below.
4.1 Power Distance (Hofstede et al. 2009)
Traders from egalitarian cultures may have different ways to negotiate, but they will
always negotiate. Traders from large power distance cultures on the other hand are
not used to negotiate seriously. The powerful dictate the conditions. The less powerful
have to accept. In feminine or collectivist cultures the powerful may exercise restraint,
or the lower ranked may successfully plead for compassion, but this is not a joint deci-
sion making process like a negotiation is. The higher ranked partner decides. When
people from hierarchical cultures are forced to negotiate, because they are in a position
of equal status or trade with foreigners, the negotiations often end in a game of power.
The higher ranked in hierarchical societies prefer top quality commodities to stress
their position. They accept risk, because they do not expect the lower ranked to deceive
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them. The lower ranked on the other hand, avoid risk and protect themselves by settling
for base quality commodities.
A trader from a culture with large power distance expects a lower ranked busi-
ness partner to accept his conditions rapidly. If the lower ranked partner has the same
cultural background, there is no problem and the rights of the higher ranked will be
recognized and respected: the lower ranked will be modest and give in easily. How-
ever, a trader from an egalitarian culture will not give in to the pressure if his status
is lower, but will either react furiously (e.g., break off negotiations) or simply ignore
the pressure (make a counterproposal), in which case the opponent will be furious.
If a trader from a culture with large power distance negotiates with a foreigner and
assumes the foreigner to have a higher status, he may give in more easily than the
foreigner expected. In that case the foreigner may be happy, but his opponent will
not have his fair share. If both are from hierarchical cultures but do not perceive one
another’s hierarchical position they may make misattributions resulting in one of them
being dominated or stopping the negotiations.
4.2 Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede et al. 2008b)
Uncertainty avoiding traders have an emotional style of negotiation, making sure that
the opponents understand their feelings. They will not adapt their behavior to their
opponent’s. They are quality-minded and avoid risk in business transactions, espe-
cially when dealing with strangers. For uncertainty avoiding traders, time is money.
They want to go directly to their target, and are impatient. After a few unsuccessful
iterations, the uncertainty avoiding trader will break off the negotiation.
Uncertainty tolerant traders on the other hand have a relaxed style of negotiation.
They try to adapt their behavior to their counterparts, although they are not prepared
to come to an agreement at all cost. They do not show their emotions and may be
disconcerted if their opponents do. They are careful not to be more yielding than their
counterparts are, not especially modest, and are ready to break off negotiations in case
of insufficient progress.
4.3 Individualism and Collectivism (Hofstede et al. 2008a)
For a collectivistic trader negotiation has to be preceded by the formation of a relation-
ship. If that goes wrong there will be no negotiation. During the negotiation, collectivist
traders discriminate between in-group and out-group partners. They feel obliged to be
more conceding to an in-group partner, are more hesitant to break off negotiations with
in-group partners, and will try to maintain harmony as long as the opponent follows
the in-group rules. Breaking the rules asks for a reaction. The style of that reaction
may be furious, or they might never explicitly say anything, but just avoid the other
from now on. The reply to a proposal from an in-group partner will be modest, but
there is no need to be modest to an out-group partner. If an out-group partner replies
with no or small concession, negotiation is likely to be broken off, where an in-group
partner or an acquainted relation would get a second chance.
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Responsibility for in-group welfare and compliance with in-group rules always
play a prominent role in a collectivistic culture. A collectivist will accept benefits for
his in-group rather than his personal advantage as a convincing argument.
Individualists have one thing in mind during negotiations: their own personal inter-
est. Depending on their personality and incentives, this might be the material advantage
of the deal in question, or the development of new long-term trusting relations with
perspectives of future deals, or just the pleasant conversation during the negotiations,
or the satisfaction of winning the game, but one thing stands for sure: individualists
pursue private interests. So individualist traders are not very modest in their negoti-
ations, nor will they give in for the purpose of maintaining harmony. If they are not
aware of the cultural differences when trading with collectivists, they may be upset
by the lack of explicit communication, or they may upset their opponents by being
too explicit, or by talking business before the relationship has been established and
acknowledged. They are not particularly patient or impatient negotiators, but behave
patiently as long as it serves their interest.
4.4 Masculinity and Femininity (Hofstede et al. 2006)
The dimension of masculinity versus femininity can be interpreted as a preference for
performance versus cooperation. A performance oriented trader (masculine culture)
is interested in fast trades, with as many top quality goods as possible in one trade.
This trader is rather impatient, and if bids are too far off from his profile, he will walk
away quickly. The performance oriented sticks to the contract of the deal, deceive the
trade partner to the limits of the contract without any compunction, and expects the
partner to do so too. Each subsequent negotiation will be dealt with without taking
past trustworthiness into account. Each new contract will be set up from scratch. The
trader learns from mistakes to make sure that the contract will not lead to new and
uncomfortable surprises on his side.
A cooperation oriented trader (feminine culture) is interested in the relationship with
the trade partner; building trust is important. The amount of goods or quality level is
not of the most interest, because the relationship built during negotiation might pay off
in future negotiations. Given the interest in the relationship with the trade partner, a
first negotiation with a trade partner will take time that is willingly spent by the trader.
During such negotiations, the trader appreciates a negotiation process in which both
partners show a willingness to accommodate the other over time. Past negotiations do
play an important role in subsequent negotiations. The trader is perfectly willing to
see the current negotiation as a kind of continuation of the previous one. If the trade is
about the same kind of commodity, the trader will start the negotiation from the deal
of the last one. If the other accepts, then the deal can be made in one round and in
seconds, whereas the first deal might have taken a lot of rounds and lots of time.
4.5 Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation (Hofstede et al. 2008c)
Long term oriented negotiators are pragmatic and take the bigger picture. They tend
to see one bargaining instance as a small step in a long process, and their decisions
123
Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents
will be led by their estimation of the profitability or other success chances of that
longer process. Long-term oriented traders show patience. They do not rapidly break
off negotiations. They do not overcharge, but they do not rapidly give in.
Short term oriented negotiators, on the other hand, think in terms of moral princi-
ples and apply them to the situation that is before them here and now. They are very
reliable when it comes to following standards of appropriateness of behavior, but this
can make them disregard the ulterior consequences of their actions. They are conced-
ing and patient with high-status partners and do not show them distrust. Otherwise
they follow an opportunistic quality strategy.
5 Modeling Culture in ABMP
The model of the effects of culture on ABMP parameters and utility weight factors is
based on the narrative descriptions in the preceding section. The descriptions indicate
if a parameter is to be increased or decreased along each of Hofstede’s dimensions.
Table 1 summarizes the direction of the effects (increasing versus decreasing).
Some cultural dimensions have a direct effect on the parameter values, but in other
cases the influence depends on the relationship with the partner:
– The societal status of an agent and that of its partner affect behavior in societies
where power distance matters.
– Also in short-term oriented societies, partner’s status is relevant.
Table 1 Influence of culture on the utility weight factors and ABMP parameters
Culture type Conditions wq wr γ β ω ι
Large power d. Self status high +
Self status low −
Higher partner + + +! −
Lower partner −
Small power d.
Uncertainty av. Similar partner + + + +
Different p. + ++ + +
Uncer. tolerant
Individualistic
Collectivistic Ingroup partner + −
Outgroup p. + −
Masculine + + + +
Feminine − − −
Long-t. oriented − −
Short-t. oriented General +
High partners + − + −
wq Quality preference; wr Risk aversion; γ Concession factor; β Negotiation speed; ω Acceptable utility
gap; ι Impatience; + Increased parameter value; − Decreased; +! Increased every negotiation round
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– Members of uncertainty avoiding societies distrust strangers more than people they
are familiar with.
– Common group membership and group distance are important in collectivistic
societies.
In the model the agents are labeled with tags that indicate status and group member-
ship. The tags are visible to other agents so that they can estimate status difference
and group distance. The model combines effects of culture with effects of status and
group membership.
The effects on negotiation parameters and weight factors are modeled as follows.
(1) The Hofstede indices PDI, UAI, IDV, MAS, and LTO position national cultures
on the five dimensions. They are known for many countries (see, e.g., Hofstede
2001). Let H, A, I, M, and L, respectively, represent the indices as real values
scaled to [0,1], so that H = 1 represent maximal power distance, (1 − H) = 1
represent maximal egalitarianism, etc. Thus, there are 10 cultural stereotypes.
(2) Status and group distance are represented as real values in [0,1]. Where sta-
tus, status difference and group distance are relevant, the effect is conditional
upon the value of a cultural index. For instance, the product (1− I)g represent the
effect of group distance g in conjunction with collectivism (1− I); in a maximally
individualistic society, 1 − I = 0, so group distance g has no effect.
(3) As indicated in Table 1, some of the cultural stereotypes may have a positive,
monotonously increasing, effect on a particular parameter value; other stereo-
types may have a negative, monotonously decreasing, effect.
(4) For each parameter there may be a set of positive effects and a set of negative
effects. The joint effect of a set of effects working with equal sign is weakly dis-
junctive, i.e. the joint effect equals the maximum of the effects of the individual
dimensions1 (e.g., if we model statement “people from uncertainty avoiding or
masculine societies prefer rapid negotiations”, then the joint effect is the maxi-
mum of the effects of uncertainty avoiding and masculinity).
(5) The resulting joint negative effects are assumed to compensate for joint positive
effects, vice versa: the effect on parameter x is the difference of the joint positive
and joint negative effects.
ex = ex+ − ex−.
One can, for instance, represent the effect “in hierarchical societies parameter
x is increased in case of status difference, unless the society is collectivistic or
feminine” as follows:
ex = ex,H(si −s j )
[
H(si − s j )
] − max {ex,(1−I )g [(1 − I )g] , ex,1−M (1 − M)
}
,
1 Weak disjunction is taken as the formalism to combine effects of cultural dimensions working in the same
direction, because it takes only the stronger of the dimensions into account. This is to be preferred to, for
instance, linear combinations, or (weighted) geometrical averaging, because in those cases a strong effect
of a high value of one dimension would be conditional upon high values of the other dimensions. Weak
disjunction is also preferred to stronger forms of disjunction, because combination of moderate values of
several dimensions must not have a strong joint effect.
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Where ex,D represent a function that computes the effect of D on x. No actual
evidence for the form or the range of the functions is available. In the current
model we assume linear relations with range [0,1] for ex,D , so the above example
would reduce to
ex = H(si − s j ) − max [(1 − I )g, 1 − M] .
(6) Joint positive and joint negative effects deduced from Table 1 are presented in
Table 2.
(7) The actual value of x is assumed to be a function that maps xT (the typical value
of x) and the effect ex to a range [xL ,xH ], xL ≤ xT ≤ xH . In the current model
we take a simple approach and use linear interpolation:
x = xT + ex + |ex |2 (xH − xT ) +
ex − |ex |
2
(xT − xL).
(8) The utility weights wi , i = v, q, r , are to be normalized for proper functioning
of ABMP. Culturally adjusted values of w′q , and w′r (see Table 2) are relative to
w′v = 1, so:
wi = w
′
i
1 + w′q + w′r
.
(9) The culturally adjusted parameter values and weight factors resulting from rules
(1)–(8) are used in the ABMP evaluation of bids, in the decisions (to accept or
not; to continue or not; see Hofstede et al. 2006), and in the planning of a new
bid. In each round of the negotiation, the parameters are recomputed.
The next section presents results obtained from this model.
6 Test Runs
The models discussed in the previous sections, including the ABMP architecture, are
implemented in a multi-agent simulation, where agents can select trade partners, nego-
tiate business transactions with price, quality, and certification as attributes, deliver
truthfully or opportunistically, have deliveries tested for quality, and update beliefs
about partners according to experiences in negotiations and testing. The simulation
environment is implemented in Cormas.2
The model was tested for correct implementation. The observed variables were:
– The number of successful negotiations (i.e. terminated with a contract) in runs of
200 time steps with a population of 8 supplier agents and 8 customers;
– The percentage of negotiations that failed, i.e. that were terminated by one of the
agents before agreement was reached;
2 http://cormas.cirad.fr/indexeng.htm
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Table 2 Formulas for the effects of culture on negotiation parameters; H, A, I, M, and L represent the
scaled Hofstede indices; si represent the agent’s societal status in [0, 1]; sj partner’s status; group distance
g between the agent and partner is computed from agent labels, with 0 representing minimal distance, 1
maximal distance; ρ represent the round number in the current negotiation
x Increasing effect ex+ of culture on x Decreasing effect ex− of culture
w′q max (Hsi , A, M, 1 − L) max
[
H (1 − si ) , 1 − M, L
]
w′r max
⎡
⎣
H
(
s j − si
)
, A,
√
Ag,
(1 − I ) g, M
⎤
⎦ max
[
H
(
si − s j
)
, (1 − L) s j
]
γ max
⎡
⎣
H
(
s j − si
)
, (1 − I ) (1 − g) ,
(1 − L) s j
⎤
⎦
β max [A, M] max [(1 − I ) g, 1 − M]
ω H
(
s j − si
)
ρ
ι max (A, M) max
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎢
H
(
s j − si
)
, (1 − I ) (1 − g) ,
(1 − M) , L , (1 − L) s j
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥
– The percentage of successful negotiations leading to top quality transactions, as a
measure of willingness to accept risk.
In all test runs, the agents were set to be neutral with respect to trust, i.e. they had no
information whether their partners were trustworthy or not (t = 0.5). The option of
certification was switched of, so that agents were forced to accept risk if they bought
top quality products.
The following hypotheses about agents behavior in this environment are formu-
lated on the basis of the narrative descriptions in this article’s section on culture and
bargaining.
H1 In hierarchical societies (large power distance), high-ranked agents buy top qual-
ity products; low-raked agents buy basic quality products to protect themselves
from risk.
H2 In hierarchical societies, high-ranked agents are more successful trading with
low-ranked than with equal-status partners, because lower-ranked yield.
H3 In uncertainty avoiding societies, high quality products are preferred, but agents
are risk-avoiding and impatient. Therefore, trade proceeds less smooth in uncer-
tainty avoiding than in uncertainty tolerant societies.
H4 In uncertainty avoiding societies, inter-group trade fails more often than in-group
trade.
H5 In collectivistic societies, in-group trade runs smoother than inter-group trade.
H6 In masculine societies, agents deal rapidly but many negotiations fail, due to the
combination of impatience and high quality ambitions.
H7 In feminine societies, negotiations proceed slowly, but with a low failure rate.
H8 In short-term oriented societies, agents prefer top quality.
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Table 3 Average results of simulated negotiations for cultural stereotypes, with the value for the particular
dimension set to either 0.1 or 0.9 and the values for the other dimensions set to 0.5 (8 suppliers; 8 customers;
10 runs of 200 time steps for each configuration; parameter values as in Table 4)
Culture type Conditions Number of transactions % Failed negotiations % Top quality
Large power d. Self status high 44 57 97
Self status low 50 60 0
Customer higher 77 45 98
Supplier higher 4 92 0
Small power d. 72 49 2
Uncertainty av. Similar partner 29 71 76
Different p. 27 73 87
Uncer. tolerant 49 58 1
Individualistic 66 50 1
Collectivistic Ingroup partner 117 13 61
Outgroup p. 39 65 0
Masculine 36 71 80
Feminine 61 45 0
Long-term or. 55 52 0
Short-term or. General 24 72 95
High customers 57 47 91
H9 In short-term oriented societies, agents are more conceding toward high-status
partners. This leads to rapid transactions and low failure rate if partner’s status
is high.
To test the hypotheses, the model was run for each of the configurations of culture,
status and group membership represented in Table 1. To simulate a cultural stereo-
type, the value of one normalized index (H, A, I, M, or L) was set to 0.1 or 0.9, while
the values of the other normalized indices were set to 0.5. In all runs, group distance
between suppliers and customers was set to 1, except in the runs simulating uncertainty
avoiding and collectivistic societies with in-group partners, where group distance was
set to 0. Status was set to 0.5 for all agents, except in the runs where status difference
mattered. In the latter case the status of either suppliers or customers was set to 0.1
and that of their counterparts to 0.9.
For each configuration, 10 runs (with different random generator seed) were made.
Each run lasted 200 time steps with a population of 8 supplier agents and 8 customers.
In 200 time steps 8 pairs can complete approximately 100 negotiations together, so
for each configuration a total of approximately 1,000 negotiations were completed
(successfully or unsuccessfully).
Table 3 presents average results per run of simulated negotiations, using the param-
eter settings displayed in Table 4. In the following paragraphs the results are compared
with the hypotheses.
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Table 4 Parameter values used in the simulation runs
Type of value w′q w′r γ β ω ι
Typical value xT 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.02 0.3
Maximal value xH 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.1 0.7
Minimal value xL 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
w′q Quality preference; w′r Risk aversion; γ Concession factor; β Negotiation speed; ω Acceptable utility
gap; ι Impatience
H1 is confirmed. In hierarchical societies, the higher-status agents buy top quality
products and accept the associated risk. The lower-status agents buy basic quality
products.
H2 is partly confirmed. In this simulation the higher-ranked agents succeed in enforc-
ing transactions only in the consumer role. In the supplier role the higher-ranked
supplier agents insist on selling top quality to lower-ranked agents and the lower-
ranked keep asking for basic quality until the suppliers break-off.
H3 is confirmed. In uncertainty avoiding societies, top quality is dominantly traded
and transaction success is lower than in uncertainty tolerant societies.
H4 is confirmed. In uncertainty avoiding agent societies, transactions with strangers
mostly fail.
H5 is confirmed. In collectivistic societies, in-group trade runs smoothly and agents
show trust in each other, trading top quality products. Collectivist inter-group
trade is less efficient than in-group trade and also less efficient than trade in
individualistic societies.
H6 is confirmed. Failure rate is high in the masculine society.
H7 is confirmed. Failure rate is low in the feminine society and negotiations proceed
relatively slow.
H8 is confirmed. The agents in the short-term oriented societies dominantly trade
top quality products.
H9 is confirmed. When trading with high-ranked customers, transaction rate is high
and failure is low in short-term oriented societies.
These results comply with the expected behavior of the agents and verify the imple-
mentation. However, they do not validate that the implemented model generates believ-
able culturally differentiated agent behavior.
For that purpose results produced by this model can be compared with results known
from intercultural negotiation literature. For instance, Brett and Okumura (1998) report
that joint gains in intercultural negotiations between Japanese and USA negotiators
were lower than in either Japanese-Japanese or USA-USA negotiations. These situa-
tions are tested with the present model. All agents are assumed to have equal status.
Japanese culture is more uncertainty avoiding and collectivistic than USA culture.
Group distance experienced by the negotiators is expected to be very relevant in Japan.
To verify this effect, tests are run with maximal group distance g = 1 and reduced
group distance g = 0.5 for the intra-cultural negotiations. In human negotiations, the
effect of group distance can be reduced by getting acquainted, but we assume that
Japanese agents will still experience USA agents more as strangers than out-group
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Table 5 Average results of simulated negotiations between agents configured with cultural dimensions
similar to Japan (H = 0.5, A = 0.9, I = 0.4, M = 0.9, L = 0.8) and USA (H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I =
0.9, M = 0.6, L = 0.3) (8 suppliers; 8 customers; 10 runs of 200 time steps; parameter values as in Table 4;
status = 0.5 for all agents)
Supplier/customer Group distance Number of transactions % Failed negotiations % Top quality
USA/USA g = 1 31 70 70
Japan/Japan g = 1 9 90 0
USA/USA g = 0.5 32 70 69
Japan/Japan g = 0.5 43 60 23
USA/Japan g = 1 0 100
Japan/USA g = 1 19 81 37
USA/Japan g = 0.7 7 93 0
Japan/USA g = 0.7 22 79 38
Japanese agents. Therefore, intercultural tests are run with g = 1 and g = 0.7. For
The hypotheses to be tested in this situation are:
H10 Japanese agent’s negotiation results strongly depend on group distance.
H11 Intercultural negotiations between simulated USA and Japanese agents are less
efficient than intra-cultural negotiations in those countries.
H12 Even if group distance is reduced, better results are obtained in a culturally
homogeneous than in an intercultural setting.
The results presented in Table 5 confirm the hypotheses. USA agents are not very
sensitive to group distance, but Japanese are. Under the assumption that Japanese
agents experience larger group distance with USA than with other Japanese, H11 and
H12 are confirmed. The difference in results with USA and Japan in customer versus
supplier role is caused by differences in risk attitude.
The second example of results obtained with realistic cultural indices is based on
results of human gaming simulations by Meijer et al. (2006). One of their findings is
that Dutch buyers prefer to trust their suppliers with respect to agreements to deliver
top quality products, while buyers from the USA prefer certification and third party
testing. Simulations were run to test if the model could simulate this effect. For this
test the following parameter settings were modified:
– quality preference w′Q was raised to 0.2 (to stimulate to top quality trade);
– trust in each other agent was set to t = 0.8 (to enable trusting behavior);
– the certification option was switched on, i.e. buyers had the opportunity to demand
a certificate, which incurs extra cost on the suppliers (10% of the maximum price
of top quality products) and thereby raises price.
All agents are equally configured, except for culture. The hypothesis is:
H13 Agents configured as Dutch buyers are more inclined to trust than USA agents;
customer agents configured with USA culture are more inclined to pay for
certified quality than Dutch agents.
The results presented in Table 6 confirm this hypothesis.
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Table 6 Average results of simulated negotiations between agents configured with cultural dimensions
similar to Dutch (H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I = 0.8, M = 0.1, L = 0.4) and USA (H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I =
0.9, M = 0.6, L = 0.3) (8 suppliers; 8 customers; 5 runs of 200 time steps; parameter values as in Table 4,
except typical value of w′Q = 0.2)
Supplier/Customer Number of
transactions
% Failed
negotiations
% Top quality % Certified
transactions
USA/USA 48 54 89 15
Dutch/Dutch 50 48 94 7
Dutch/USA 54 49 91 13
USA/Dutch 45 57 93 4
7 Conclusion
Negotiation can be approached as a rational process of collaborative decision making,
as advocated by Raiffa et al. (2002). However, it is observed that negotiation outcomes
differ across the world and that people from different countries differ with respect to
the way they negotiate and the results they obtain (Gelfand and Brett 2004). As to all
forms of negotiations, this applies to business negotiations and the bargaining about
commercial transactions. There is abundant evidence that the result of decision mak-
ing in business is influenced by the cultural background of the decision makers (e.g.,
Graham et al. 1994; Adair et al. 2004; Metcalf et al. 2006) or institutional differences
across countries (e.g., Kumar and Worm 2004), the development of which is also influ-
enced by culture (Hofstede 2001). Therefore, agent-based simulations of international
supply chains and networks should account for cultural differences.
De Rosis et al. (2004) suggested to explore the feasibility of Geert Hofstede’s five-
dimensional model (Hofstede 2001) to differentiate agents’ behavior across cultures.
The present paper shows how Hofstede’s theory can be used for this purpose, in a
multi-agent simulation of international trade.
In contrast with models that aim to optimize rational decision making, the model
should in this case realistically simulate human negotiation behavior. The ABMP
negotiation architecture (Jonker and Treur 2001) was validated to satisfy this require-
ment by Bosse et al. (2004) . Therefore, the ABMP architecture is chosen as the basis
for modeling cultural differences. A model has been developed for the joint effect of
the dimensions of culture on ABMP parameters, based on earlier work that modeled
the separate effects of individual dimensions (Hofstede et al. 2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009).
The model proposed in this paper has been tested on imaginary stereotypical cul-
tures that differ on only one of the dimensions. Tendencies in the results along each
of the dimensions comply with what is expected on the basis Geert Hofstede’s theory.
The tests with the stereotypical cultures confirm that the model is sensitive to varia-
tions of the cultural indices in the desired direction. Further testing with combinations
of dimensions that are drawn from actual cultures should give evidence of the model’s
validity.
Two examples are given of simulations of results of negotiation research reported
in business science literature. The simulations reproduce qualitative aspects of the
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cases reported in that literature, thus confirming that the model can reproduce actual
cultural effects. However, this does not provide a full validation of the model. It is a test
that confirms the model’s sensitivity for relevant parameters. Validation and tuning of
parameters require more simulations of actual cases from literature or experiments.
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